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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion docs/status.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ that ship, under QEMU with OVMF firmware.
| Stages 01–02: cross toolchain, temporary tools | **tested**: glibc carries two upstream loader fixes the 2.40 tarball lacks (`build/patches/glibc-2.40/`), and each glibc build proves with `readelf` that its loader takes its own map bounds without a run-time relocation |
| Stage 04: base system | **tested**: every package builds with the hardening set; `make test-libc-unwind` (the target libc unwinds through a dlopened library), `make smoke-userspace`, `make audit-artifacts` (the ELF headers of what shipped) |
| Stage 05: hardened kernel | **tested**: the stage refuses a config that drops a fragment line or that kernel-hardening-checker faults beyond the accepted list; every VM suite boots the kernel (EFI stub, compiled-in command line with `CMDLINE_OVERRIDE`), `make integrity-test` its dm-init verity root, and `make zones-test` Landlock, seccomp and cgroup v2 on it |
| Stage 06: install media and release payloads | **tested**: the firmware, install, integrity and update suites boot its USB image and ISO, whose kernels are signed with the build's Secure Boot key; the stage strips every setuid bit the allowlist does not justify (`tools/tests/audit-setuid.sh`) and checks that the image's trust anchor refuses a statement signed by the release key |
| Stage 06: install media and release payloads | **tested**: the firmware, install, integrity and update suites boot its USB image and ISO, whose kernels are signed with the build's Secure Boot key; the stage fails the build on any setuid bit or file capability its allowlists do not justify (`tools/tests/audit-setuid.sh`) and checks that the image's trust anchor refuses a statement signed by the release key |
| Firmware boot of the media | **tested**: `make media-smoke-usb` / `media-smoke-iso`, firmware discovery only (no `-kernel`, `-initrd`, `-append` or host filesystem; acceptance reads the recorded QEMU commands back) |
| Installation and the state partition | **tested**: `make install-test` (install, boot alone, reboot, cold boot, refusals including an injected I/O error), `make state-test` (a cloned disk, ambiguous labels, a corrupt or missing state partition: the system boots degraded and says so) |
| Boot integrity | **tested**: `make media-smoke-secureboot`, `make media-refused-foreign-keys` (Microsoft keys refuse the medium), `make integrity-test` (a foreign-signed boot file refused, a tampered root refused by dm-verity, recovery from the medium with state intact) |
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