ci: pin third-party actions to full commit SHAs#3026
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Pin third-party actions on mutable @master/@main tags in credentialed jobs: - chetan/invalidate-cloudfront-action (web.release.prod.yml) — handed production AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY - convictional/trigger-workflow-and-wait (snjs.pr.yml, e2e jobs) — handed CI_PAT_TOKEN - johnnyhuy/actions-discord-git-webhook (web.release.prod.yml) — handed DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL A moved tag would run unreviewed code with those credentials. Behaviour unchanged; per GitHub's pin-to-SHA guidance. Signed-off-by: Kobi Hikri <kobi.hikri@gmail.com>
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What
Pin three third-party actions currently on
@master/@mainto their commit SHA:chetan/invalidate-cloudfront-action@masterweb.release.prod.yml(deploy)convictional/trigger-workflow-and-wait@mastersnjs.pr.yml(e2e-base, e2e-vaults)CI_PAT_TOKEN(PAT)johnnyhuy/actions-discord-git-webhook@mainweb.release.prod.yml(notify)DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URLWhy
@master/@mainare moving refs. Theinvalidate-cloudfront-actionstep is handed the production AWSaccess key + secret; a moved tag there (compromise or an accidental change) would run unreviewed code
with those keys — the class behind the 2025
tj-actions/changed-filesincident, here allowing S3/CloudFronttakeover. Pinning to a SHA removes that.
Scope / safety
Behaviour unchanged (each SHA is the current tip). Signed-off. Per GitHub's pin-to-SHA guidance.
AI-assisted; I verified the workflows, the credential exposure, and the pinned SHAs myself.