fix(security): redact upstream secrets in docker spawn argv debug logs (#712)#713
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At logging.level=debug, docker-command upstreams injected Slack/Jira tokens as `-e KEY=VALUE` flags that several argv/command log sites rendered in cleartext to main.log. Masking was inconsistent — only the shellwrap line was partially handled. Add a shared redaction helper in internal/shellwrap that masks the VALUE of docker env flags (`-e`/`--env`) while leaving keys, flags, and image names intact. It covers the two-token form (`-e`, `KEY=VALUE`), the glued single-token form (`-eKEY=VALUE`), and the embedded command-string form (the `-c` argument of a login-shell wrap), reusing secret.MaskSecretValue. Apply it at every argv/command debug log site in the spawn path: shellwrap.WrapWithUserShell (wrapped_command + original_args), connection_stdio.go (original_args/modified_args/final_args), and the process-group CommandFunc on unix + windows. Related #712
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Approved via Claude Code review: RedactDockerArgs/RedactDockerCommandString covers two-token, glued (-eKEY=, --env=), and embedded command-string forms; preserves keys/quotes; reuses secret.MaskSecretValue; nil-safe & non-mutating. Applied at all 4 leaking log sites. CI fully green (0 fail). Verified for GH #712.
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Summary
Fixes GH #712: at
logging.level: debug, mcpproxy wrote upstream server secrets (Slack/Jira tokens passed as-e KEY=valueto docker-command upstreams) in cleartext to~/Library/Logs/mcpproxy/main.log. Masking was inconsistent — only the shellwrap line was partially handled while several argv-logging sites emitted the full-e KEY=valuelist.Fix
internal/shellwrap/redact.go:RedactDockerArgs([]string) []string— masks the VALUE of docker env flags in an argv slice, leaving keys, flags (run,--rm), and image names untouched. Handles the two-token form (-e,KEY=VALUE), the glued single-token form (-eKEY=VALUE/--env=KEY=VALUE), and the embedded command-string form (the-carg of a login-shell wrap). Input slice is never mutated.RedactDockerCommandString(string) string— masks-e/--envvalues inside a single command string (handles quoted tokens).internal/secret.MaskSecretValue(no import cycle —secretdoes not importshellwrap).shellwrap.WrapWithUserShell→wrapped_command+original_argsconnection_stdio.go→original_args(docker-detected),modified_args(injected),final_args+original_args(initialized transport),original_args(wrapWithUserShell)process_unix.go/process_windows.go→args("Process group configuration applied")Tests (TDD — failing test written first)
internal/shellwrap/redact_test.go: two-token, glued, command-string-element, command-string, no-env-unchanged, input-not-mutated, plus a guard test capturingWrapWithUserShell's zap output to assert no cleartext secret leaks.internal/upstream/core/process_redact_test.go: guard test driving the process-groupCommandFunc(off the spawn path, client=nil) for both shell-wrapped and direct-exec forms, asserting no secret in the logged fields.Acceptance
go test -race ./internal/shellwrap/ ./internal/upstream/core/— greengolangci-lint run --config .github/.golangci.yml(v2) — 0 issuesGOOS=windows go build ./internal/upstream/core/— OKxoxc-…) no longer appears in any masked argv/command debug field.Related #712