New advisories for [datadog, mcp, sanitize, savon] gems

gems/datadog/GHSA-p7cx-x3jr-jj6w.yml

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+---
+gem: datadog
+ghsa: p7cx-x3jr-jj6w
+url: https://github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-rb/security/advisories/GHSA-p7cx-x3jr-jj6w
+title: ReDOS in URL query string obfuscation
+date: 2026-10-13
+description: |
+  ## SUMMARY
+
+  A regular expression used to obfuscate URL query strings can consume
+  excessive CPU when processing certain attacker-controlled input.
+  This can stall request processing and cause denial of service in
+  applications using affected HTTP tracing integrations.
+
+  ## Impact
+
+  Regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) affecting applications
+  that process attacker-controlled URL query strings through the
+  vulnerable obfuscation pattern. Successful exploitation can cause
+  excessive CPU consumption, prolonged request latency, and service
+  unavailability.
+
+  Only Ruby versions below 3.2 are affected, and the query obfuscation
+  feature is disabled by default.
+cvss_v4: 8.7
+patched_versions:
+  - ">= 2.45.0"
+related:
+  url:
+    - https://rubygems.org/gems/datadog/versions/2.45.0
+    - https://github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-rb/releases/tag/v2.45.0
+    - https://github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-rb/pull/6441
+    - https://github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-rb/security/advisories/GHSA-p7cx-x3jr-jj6w
+notes: |
+  - No CVE from GHSA URL.
+  - cvss_v4 from GHSA URL.
+  - date from rubygems.org URL.

gems/mcp/GHSA-4m5j-jjfc-97gx.yml

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+---
+gem: mcp
+ghsa: 4m5j-jjfc-97gx
+url: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-4m5j-jjfc-97gx
+title: OAuth discovery security check allows SSRF to private hosts over HTTPS
+date: 2026-08-14
+description: |
+  ## SUMMARY
+
+  The OAuth client validates the server-controlled resource_metadata
+  URL before fetching it, but the check only requires HTTPS. It does
+  not block private, link-local, or cloud-metadata addresses.
+  A server can return 401 WWW-Authenticate: Bearer
+  resource_metadata="https://169.254.169.254/..." or an internal HTTPS
+  URL, and the client issues a GET to it during discovery. This is a
+  server-side request forgery against internal HTTPS services and
+  cloud metadata endpoints from the client's network position.
+
+  The check also reads only the dotted-decimal spelling of an address,
+  so the same destinations stay reachable through the numeric forms
+  the resolver accepts.
+
+  ## Impact
+
+  Server-side request forgery (CWE-918), limited to HTTPS targets. A
+  server the client connects to can make the client send GET requests
+  to internal HTTPS services and cloud metadata endpoints it can route
+  to but the attacker cannot. The request fires automatically during
+  OAuth discovery, before the user approves anything. The response
+  is schema-validated, so this is closer to a blind SSRF than a direct
+  read of the target's body, but it still allows reaching internal
+  HTTPS services, probing reachability, and triggering GET-based side
+  effects. HTTP to non-loopback hosts is already blocked, so the gap
+  is specifically HTTPS to private and metadata addresses.
+
+  A suggested fix is to extend the check so it also rejects URLs whose
+  host resolves to loopback, link-local, private, or cloud-metadata
+  ranges, and ideally require the URL to share an origin with the MCP
+  server. The scheme check alone does not prevent SSRF.
+unaffected_versions:
+  - "< 0.17.0"
+patched_versions:
+  - ">= 1.2.0"
+related:
+  url:
+    - https://rubygems.org/gems/mcp/versions/1.2.0
+    - https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/releases/tag/v1.2.0
+    - https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-4m5j-jjfc-97gx
+notes: |
+  - No CVE from GHSA URL.
+  - "moderate" severity on GHSA URL, but no cvss numbers.

gems/sanitize/GHSA-wgw9-qhqg-8hv5.yml

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+---
+gem: sanitize
+ghsa: wgw9-qhqg-8hv5
+url: https://github.com/rgrove/sanitize/security/advisories/GHSA-wgw9-qhqg-8hv5
+title: CSS property and URL allowlists can be bypassed via
+  CSS nesting in stylesheets
+date: 2026-10-21
+description: |
+  ## SUMMARY
+
+  When Sanitize is configured to allow <style> elements, when
+  Sanitize::CSS#stylesheet or Sanitize::CSS#tree! is used to sanitize
+  a stylesheet directly, or when the output of Sanitize::CSS#properties
+  is embedded inside a style rule in a stylesheet, an attacker can
+  bypass Sanitize's CSS property allowlist and URL protocol allowlist.
+  This is possible because Sanitize doesn't parse stylesheets the way
+  browsers that implement CSS Nesting (current versions of all major
+  browsers) do.
+
+  ## Impact
+
+  Because the attacker also controls the selector that the smuggled
+  declarations apply to, an attacker could:
+
+  Apply arbitrary CSS properties to elements on the page, such as
+  overlaying content to mislead users into clicking something (UI redressing).
+
+  Cause the user's browser to load resources from URLs that the CSS
+  protocol allowlist was meant to block. Combined with attribute
+  selectors, this could be used to exfiltrate data from the page,
+  such as the values of form inputs.
+
+  This issue does not allow script execution.
+cvss_v4: 5.3
+unaffected_versions:
+  - "< 3.0.0"
+patched_versions:
+  - ">= 7.0.1"
+related:
+  url:
+    - https://rubygems.org/gems/sanitize/versions/7.0.1
+    - https://github.com/rgrove/sanitize/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#701-2026-10-21
+    - https://github.com/rgrove/sanitize/security/advisories/GHSA-wgw9-qhqg-8hv5
+notes: |
+  - No CVE from GHSA URL.
+  - cvss_v4 from GHSA URL.

gems/savon/GHSA-x99v-rwvj-g9p5.yml

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+---
+gem: savon
+ghsa: x99v-rwvj-g9p5
+url: https://github.com/savonrb/savon/security/advisories/GHSA-x99v-rwvj-g9p5
+title: WSDL operation named client overwrites Savon::Model internal
+  client accessor, causing unbounded recursion and SystemStackError
+date: 2026-09-09
+description: |
+  ## SUMMARY
+
+  Savon::Model#all_operations generates a class-level method for every
+  operation named in the WSDL. A WSDL operation named client normalizes
+  to the Ruby method name :client, which overwrites Savon::Model's own
+  internal client accessor, and since the generated method body itself
+  calls client.call ..., the method now calls itself forever and the
+  Ruby process dies with an unhandled SystemStackError.
+
+  ## Impact
+
+  An application that builds a Savon::Model from a WSDL it does not
+  fully control, calls all_operations, and later touches model.client
+  crashes with an unhandled SystemStackError. SystemStackError is not
+  a StandardError, so ordinary rescue blocks do not catch it and the
+  failure usually takes the worker process down. Availability only;
+  no confidentiality or integrity effect.
+patched_versions:
+  - ">= 2.17.5"
+related:
+  url:
+    - https://rubygems.org/gems/savon/versions/2.17.5
+    - https://github.com/savonrb/savon/releases/tag/v2.17.5
+    - https://github.com/savonrb/savon/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#2175---2026-09-09
+    - https://github.com/savonrb/savon/security/advisories/GHSA-x99v-rwvj-g9p5
+notes: |
+  - No CVE from GHSA URL.
+  - GHSA URL has "Moderate" severity, but no cvss numbers.
+  - From GHSA URL: "Confirmed [vulnerability] in shipped releases
+    v2.17.1, v2.17.2 and v2.17.4, and on main HEAD
+    544bcaacd5b635f5cc888e2b9acaf55ee40be4e3."