ci: pin third-party actions to commit SHA (supply-chain hardening)#4393
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camgrimsec wants to merge 1 commit into
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ci: pin third-party actions to commit SHA (supply-chain hardening)#4393camgrimsec wants to merge 1 commit into
camgrimsec wants to merge 1 commit into
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Pins all GitHub Actions references in .github/workflows/ to a full 40-character commit SHA, with the original tag preserved as a trailing comment. This protects CI from a compromised tag — the same class of attack used in the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (CVE-2025-30066, March 2025), where a malicious commit was force-pushed to a mutable tag and stole secrets from every workflow that consumed it. GitHub's own hardening guidance recommends pinning third-party actions to a full commit SHA for exactly this reason: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#using-third-party-actions Scope: - claude.yml : 2 pins - python.yml : 10 pins - readme-pr-check.yml: 2 pins - release.yml : 13 pins - typescript.yml : 7 pins Total: 34 references across 5 workflows, 10 unique actions. All pinned SHAs resolved from the tag's current commit object via the GitHub REST API on 2026-06-20. No behavior change: SHAs were resolved from the same refs the workflows currently use (e.g. @v6 → SHA of v6 tag's commit). Dependabot can still bump these — it understands the 'SHA + trailing version comment' pattern and will open PRs to update to the next SHA when a new tag is published.
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Pins all GitHub Actions references in .github/workflows/ to a full 40-character commit SHA, with the original tag preserved as a trailing comment. This protects CI from a compromised tag — the same class of attack used in the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (CVE-2025-30066, March 2025), where a malicious commit was force-pushed to a mutable tag and stole secrets from every workflow that consumed it.
GitHub's own hardening guidance recommends pinning third-party actions to a full commit SHA for exactly this reason:
https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#using-third-party-actions
Scope:
Total: 34 references across 5 workflows, 10 unique actions.
All pinned SHAs resolved from the tag's current commit object via the GitHub REST API on 2026-06-20. No behavior change: SHAs were resolved from the same refs the workflows currently use (e.g. @v6 → SHA of v6 tag's commit).
Dependabot can still bump these — it understands the 'SHA + trailing version comment' pattern and will open PRs to update to the next SHA when a new tag is published.
Description
Publishing Your Server
Note: We are no longer accepting PRs to add servers to the README. Instead, please publish your server to the MCP Server Registry to make it discoverable to the MCP ecosystem.
To publish your server, follow the quickstart guide. You can browse published servers at https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/.
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How Has This Been Tested?
Breaking Changes
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Checklist
Additional context