Pointer chain checks

contrib/warden/pointer_chain_examples.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+-- ============================================================================
+-- POINTER_CHAIN_CHECK (type 244 / 0xF4) example seeds for the `warden` table.
+--
+-- Wire format on the client side is identical to MEM_CHECK (243 / 0xF3); the
+-- server walks a multi-hop pointer dereference chain across consecutive Warden
+-- cycles and `memcmp`-validates the bytes at the final resolved address.
+--
+-- Schema reminder (see WardenCheckMgr::LoadWardenChecks):
+--   id        uint16   -- check id
+--   build     uint16   -- client build (vanilla 1.12.1 enUS = 5875)
+--   type      uint8    -- 244 for POINTER_CHAIN_CHECK
+--   data      string   -- unused for this type (leave empty)
+--   result    string   -- hex of the EXPECTED final-hop bytes (length must
+--                         match the `length` column)
+--   address   uint32   -- chain base address (32-bit, x86)
+--   length    uint8    -- bytes to read at the final hop (1..N)
+--   str       string   -- comma-separated hex offsets, e.g. '0x10,0x24,0x8'.
+--                         Empty string = zero hops (degenerate single-read).
+--                         Each offset is added to the pointer dereferenced at
+--                         the previous hop to produce the next hop's address.
+--                         A leading '!' flips the terminal compare: instead of
+--                         "fail on mismatch" (verify expected bytes), the row
+--                         becomes "fail on match" (detect a forbidden cheat
+--                         signature, e.g. PQR landing in a dynamically
+--                         resolved memory region). The '!' is consumed before
+--                         the offsets are parsed, so '!0x4,0x8' is a 2-hop
+--                         chain in signature-detect mode.
+--   comment   string   -- free text
+--
+-- Walk semantics for offsets `o1, o2, ..., oN` and base `B`:
+--     hop 0 (intermediate): read 4 bytes at B          -> P0
+--     hop 1 (intermediate): read 4 bytes at P0 + o1    -> P1
+--     hop 2 (intermediate): read 4 bytes at P1 + o2    -> P2
+--     ...
+--     hop N (terminal):     read `length` bytes at P_{N-1} + oN
+--
+-- IMPORTANT — addresses below are templates calibrated for the canonical
+-- vanilla 1.12.1 enUS WoW.exe (build 5875,
+-- MD5 5fea0d4eed95002f436200a16a4f4795). Image base 0x00400000. They are
+-- consistent with the function addresses already used in WardenWin.cpp's
+-- module-init block (SFileOpenFile = 0x002485F0 + image base, etc.) and with
+-- offsets widely documented in vanilla emulation/cheat communities (e.g.
+-- ownedcore vanilla reverse-engineering threads, public vanilla bot/cheat
+-- repos).
+--
+-- BEFORE GOING TO PRODUCTION:
+--   1. Re-confirm every address against your actual binary disassembly. A
+--      different localisation (frFR, deDE, etc.) shifts addresses.
+--   2. Capture the real expected bytes at the resolved address from a known
+--      clean client and paste them into the `result` column. Placeholder
+--      values are noted with `-- TODO` below.
+--   3. Pick check ids that don't collide with your existing rows.
+-- ============================================================================
+
+
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Example 1 — Vtable hook detection on the Client Object Manager
+--
+-- Detects: cheats that hook a virtual function on the global Object Manager
+--          singleton (a common technique for "object dumper" cheats that swap
+--          a vtable slot for a thunk that filters returned objects, leaks
+--          GUIDs, or injects fake updates).
+--
+-- Chain (3 hops, terminal reads 5 bytes of the first virtual function's
+-- prologue):
+--     base = 0x00B41414           ; s_curMgr — pointer to ClntObjMgr instance
+--     hop 0: read [0x00B41414]    -> objMgrInstance
+--     hop 1: read [objMgrInstance + 0x00] -> vtable
+--     hop 2: read [vtable + 0x00] -> first virtual function pointer
+--     hop 3 (terminal): read 5 bytes at that function -> expected prologue
+--
+-- A `jmp` detour is 5 bytes (E9 XX XX XX XX), which guarantees the prologue
+-- bytes change if the function is hooked.
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+INSERT INTO `warden`
+    (`id`, `build`, `type`, `data`, `result`, `address`, `length`, `str`, `comment`)
+VALUES
+    (10001, 5875, 244, '',
+     '0000000000', -- TODO: replace with the real first 5 prologue bytes from clean WoW.exe
+     0x00B41414, 5, '0x0,0x0,0x0',
+     'Pointer chain: ClntObjMgr -> vtable -> vtable[0] -> prologue (detect vtable hook)');
+
+
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Example 2 — Hook detection on import-resolved GetTickCount
+--
+-- Detects: cheats that patch the WoW import for kernel32!GetTickCount to a
+--          thunk returning bogus timestamps, defeating the TIMING_CHECK
+--          (87/0x57). The IAT slot lives in WoW's `.idata`; following it
+--          lands inside kernel32.dll's loaded copy.
+--
+-- Chain (1 hop, terminal reads 5 bytes of the resolved function prologue):
+--     base = 0x00C2D154           ; IAT slot for kernel32!GetTickCount
+--                                 ;   (TODO: confirm RVA on your binary)
+--     hop 0 (terminal): read 5 bytes at [0x00C2D154]
+--
+-- Caveat: kernel32.dll is part of the OS, so the prologue bytes vary across
+-- Windows versions. In practice you'd seed `result` per-OS or use a small
+-- whitelist via multiple check rows. Listed here as a textbook IAT-hook
+-- pattern; consider it a template, not a drop-in.
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+INSERT INTO `warden`
+    (`id`, `build`, `type`, `data`, `result`, `address`, `length`, `str`, `comment`)
+VALUES
+    (10002, 5875, 244, '',
+     '0000000000', -- TODO: per-OS captured bytes of kernel32!GetTickCount prologue
+     0x00C2D154, 5, '',
+     'Pointer chain: WoW IAT[GetTickCount] -> kernel32 prologue (detect IAT detour)');
+
+
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Example 3 — Sanity check on Local Player object type field
+--
+-- Detects: object-replace cheats that swap the local player's object type at
+--          its UnitFields descriptor block to confuse server-side validation.
+--          Reads the object type byte, expected to be 4 (TYPEID_PLAYER) for
+--          the local player object.
+--
+-- Chain (3 hops, terminal reads 1 byte):
+--     base = 0x00B41414                       ; s_curMgr
+--     hop 0: read [0x00B41414]                -> objMgrInstance
+--     hop 1: read [objMgrInstance + 0xAC]     -> first object in linked list
+--                                                (publicly documented offset)
+--     hop 2: read [object + 0x14]             -> object type id field
+--                                                (TYPEID layout is documented
+--                                                 in Object.h)
+--
+-- Note: the linked list head at +0xAC is not always the local player; it
+-- iterates by +0x3C until matching local GUID. For a simple template we use
+-- the head — adjust if you want strict local-player semantics. This is
+-- primarily useful as a presence/structural-integrity check.
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+INSERT INTO `warden`
+    (`id`, `build`, `type`, `data`, `result`, `address`, `length`, `str`, `comment`)
+VALUES
+    (10003, 5875, 244, '',
+     '04', -- TYPEID_PLAYER
+     0x00B41414, 1, '0x0,0xAC,0x14',
+     'Pointer chain: ObjMgr -> first object -> typeId byte (detect object spoof)');
+
+
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Example 4 — Zero-hop sanity (degenerate chain)
+--
+-- Equivalent in semantics to a plain MEM_CHECK, but routed through the
+-- POINTER_CHAIN_CHECK code path. Useful as a smoke test when bringing the
+-- feature up: pick a known stable byte run in WoW.exe's `.text` (any
+-- function whose prologue you already trust) and seed the expected bytes.
+--
+-- Reads 5 bytes of the SFileOpenFile prologue at 0x006485F0
+-- (image base 0x00400000 + RVA 0x002485F0, taken straight from the
+-- WardenInitModuleRequest in src/game/Warden/WardenWin.cpp).
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+INSERT INTO `warden`
+    (`id`, `build`, `type`, `data`, `result`, `address`, `length`, `str`, `comment`)
+VALUES
+    (10004, 5875, 244, '',
+     '0000000000', -- TODO: replace with real first 5 bytes of SFileOpenFile prologue
+     0x006485F0, 5, '',
+     'Zero-hop pointer-chain smoke test (SFileOpenFile prologue)');
+
+
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Example 5 — Signature-detect mode (third-party allocation scan)
+--
+-- Inspired by Krilliac/AdvancedWarden's MEM2_CHECK / GAGARIN pair pattern,
+-- which targets cheats that allocate executable memory in well-known
+-- dynamic regions and place their payload at a fixed offset within that
+-- region. Approach there: one MEM_CHECK reads the dynamic base address and
+-- caches it on the session; a paired MEM_CHECK then scans `base + small
+-- offset` and fails when bytes != 0 (i.e. the region is not empty as it
+-- should be on a clean client).
+--
+-- Our generalised equivalent: a single POINTER_CHAIN_CHECK row that walks
+-- to the suspect address and uses signature-detect mode (leading `!`) to
+-- fail when a known cheat-signature pattern appears.
+--
+-- Chain (1 hop, terminal reads 4 bytes; fails if pattern found):
+--     base = 0x009F348            ; static slot that holds the dynamic
+--                                 ;   allocation pointer for this cheat
+--                                 ;   family. (TODO: confirm against your
+--                                 ;   binary; the AdvancedWarden seed used
+--                                 ;   address=652040=0x9F348, length=4.)
+--     hop 0 (terminal): read 4 bytes at *base + 2 (or other small offset)
+--                       expected = the cheat's 4-byte signature
+--                       fail when read == expected (signature present)
+--
+-- The leading '!' on the offset string flips the terminal compare into
+-- signature-detect mode. Pick the offset value (here 0x2) to match the
+-- byte-window where the cheat is known to land. Length must equal the
+-- length of the signature in `result`.
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+INSERT INTO `warden`
+    (`id`, `build`, `type`, `data`, `result`, `address`, `length`, `str`, `comment`)
+VALUES
+    (10005, 5875, 244, '',
+     '00003000', -- TODO: replace with the real cheat signature bytes
+     0x0009F348, 4, '!0x2',
+     'Signature detect: dynamic 3rd-party allocation scan (PQR-class)');
+
+
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Optional: action override per check id (only if you want non-default
+-- penalty for these). Default action comes from
+-- CONFIG_UINT32_WARDEN_CLIENT_FAIL_ACTION (0=LOG, 1=KICK, 2=BAN). The
+-- override lives in the characters DB.
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- INSERT INTO `warden_action` (`wardenId`, `action`) VALUES
+--     (10001, 1),  -- kick on vtable-hook detection
+--     (10002, 0),  -- log only on IAT check (more false-positive prone)
+--     (10003, 1),  -- kick on object-type spoof
+--     (10004, 0),  -- log only on smoke test
+--     (10005, 2);  -- ban on confirmed signature match

src/game/Warden/Warden.h

@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ enum WardenCheckType
     DRIVER_CHECK = 0x71,   ///< Driver check (113: uint Seed + byte[20] SHA1 + byte driverNameIndex - check to ensure driver isn't loaded)
     TIMING_CHECK = 0x57,   ///< Timing check (87: empty - check to ensure GetTickCount() isn't detoured)
     PROC_CHECK = 0x7E,     ///< Procedure check (126: uint Seed + byte[20] SHA1 + byte moluleNameIndex + byte procNameIndex + uint Offset + byte Len - check to ensure proc isn't detoured)
-    MODULE_CHECK = 0xD9    ///< Module check (217: uint Seed + byte[20] SHA1 - check to ensure module isn't injected)
+    MODULE_CHECK = 0xD9,   ///< Module check (217: uint Seed + byte[20] SHA1 - check to ensure module isn't injected)
+    POINTER_CHAIN_CHECK = 0xF4 ///< 244: SERVER-SIDE ONLY. Wire format identical to MEM_CHECK (0xF3). Walks a pointer-deref chain across multiple Warden cycles and memcmp-validates the bytes at the final resolved address. Never appears in any byte sent to or from the client module.
 };
 
 #if defined(__GNUC__)

src/game/Warden/WardenCheckMgr.cpp

@@ -141,21 +141,21 @@ void WardenCheckMgr::LoadWardenChecks()
             }
         }
 
-        if (checkType == MEM_CHECK || checkType == PAGE_CHECK_A || checkType == PAGE_CHECK_B || checkType == PROC_CHECK)
+        if (checkType == MEM_CHECK || checkType == PAGE_CHECK_A || checkType == PAGE_CHECK_B || checkType == PROC_CHECK || checkType == POINTER_CHAIN_CHECK)
         {
             wardenCheck->Address = address;
             wardenCheck->Length = length;
         }
 
         // PROC_CHECK support missing
-        if (checkType == MEM_CHECK || checkType == MPQ_CHECK || checkType == LUA_STR_CHECK || checkType == DRIVER_CHECK || checkType == MODULE_CHECK)
+        if (checkType == MEM_CHECK || checkType == MPQ_CHECK || checkType == LUA_STR_CHECK || checkType == DRIVER_CHECK || checkType == MODULE_CHECK || checkType == POINTER_CHAIN_CHECK)
         {
             wardenCheck->Str = str;
         }
 
         CheckStore.insert(std::pair<uint16, WardenCheck*>(build, wardenCheck));
 
-        if (checkType == MPQ_CHECK || checkType == MEM_CHECK)
+        if (checkType == MPQ_CHECK || checkType == MEM_CHECK || checkType == POINTER_CHAIN_CHECK)
         {
             WardenCheckResult* wr = new WardenCheckResult();
             wr->Id = id;
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ void WardenCheckMgr::GetWardenCheckIds(bool isMemCheck, uint16 build, std::list<
     {
         if (isMemCheck)
         {
-            if ((it->second->Type == MEM_CHECK) || (it->second->Type == MODULE_CHECK))
+            if ((it->second->Type == MEM_CHECK) || (it->second->Type == MODULE_CHECK) || (it->second->Type == POINTER_CHAIN_CHECK))
             {
                 idl.push_back(it->second->CheckId);
             }