[GHSA-78fc-9688-w8xw] OpenMRS Module Upload Vulnerable to Path Traversal (Zip Slip)

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-78fc-9688-w8xw/GHSA-78fc-9688-w8xw.json

@@ -9,13 +9,9 @@
   "summary": "OpenMRS Module Upload Vulnerable to Path Traversal (Zip Slip)",
   "details": "## Affected Versions\n\nversion ≤ 2.7.8 (latest version at time of disclosure)\n\nhttps://github.com/openmrs/openmrs-core\n\n## Impact\n\nThe endpoint `POST /openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` is vulnerable to a path traversal (Zip Slip) attack. An authenticated attacker can upload a crafted `.omod` archive containing ZIP entries with directory traversal sequences. Upon automatic extraction by the server, the incomplete path validation in `WebModuleUtil.startModule()` fails to prevent entries such as `web/module/../../../../malicious.jsp` from being written outside the intended module directory. If the traversal target falls within the web application root (e.g., `/usr/local/tomcat/webapps/openmrs/`), the attacker achieves arbitrary file write and subsequent Remote Code Execution.\n\nNotably, other extraction methods in the same codebase (`ModuleUtil.expandJar()`, `TestInstallUtil.addZippedTestModules()`) are properly protected with `normalize().startsWith()` checks — this vulnerability is an oversight where the same fix was not applied.\n\nFurthermore, the `module.allow_web_admin` runtime property, which is intended to restrict administrators from managing modules via the web interface, only gates the Legacy UI controller entry point. The REST API endpoint `POST /openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` does not check this property, allowing this restriction to be fully bypassed.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Construct a malicious `.omod` file (which is a ZIP/JAR archive) containing a ZIP entry with a path traversal payload in its entry name, such as `web/module/../../../../<target_filename>`. Upload this file to `POST /openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` with valid admin credentials via Basic Auth.\n\n<img width=\"1986\" height=\"1102\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/647f15de-7e8c-40b9-aba9-d4db5d2e0b52\" />\n\n<img width=\"2048\" height=\"1078\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/301412a0-e3b0-4afb-91c2-e9739de3080d\" />\n\n\n2. The server parses and loads the module. During `WebModuleUtil.startModule()`, entries under `web/module/` are automatically extracted. The existing check `Paths.get(name).startsWith(\"..\")` only blocks entries beginning with `..`, so an entry starting with `web/module/` passes the check. The `../` sequences in the remaining path cause the file to be written outside the intended `WEB-INF/view/module/` directory — for example, into the web application root at `/usr/local/tomcat/webapps/openmrs/`.\n\n<img width=\"1439\" height=\"141\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4bda3b1e-a80e-42ed-af2b-a1da53e8db03\" />\n\n3. The traversed file is now accessible under the web application root. If the written file is a JSP script, accessing it via the browser triggers server-side execution, achieving RCE.\n\n<img width=\"1482\" height=\"300\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/61936002-78cd-4203-80f0-f0a8702b216c\" />\n\n## Root Cause Analysis\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `WebModuleUtil.startModule()` (`web/src/main/java/org/openmrs/module/web/WebModuleUtil.java`).\n\n### Vulnerable code:\n\n```java\nEnumeration<JarEntry> entries = jarFile.entries();\nwhile (entries.hasMoreElements()) {\n    JarEntry entry = entries.nextElement();\n    String name = entry.getName();\n\n    // ❌ Incomplete check — only blocks entries starting with \"..\"\n    if (Paths.get(name).startsWith(\"..\")) {\n        throw new UnsupportedOperationException(\"...\");\n    }\n\n    if (name.startsWith(\"web/module/\")) {\n        String filepath = name.substring(11);\n        StringBuilder absPath = new StringBuilder(realPath + \"/WEB-INF\");\n        absPath.append(\"/view/module/\");\n        absPath.append(mod.getModuleIdAsPath()).append(\"/\").append(filepath);\n\n        // ❌ No normalize() or startsWith() boundary check before writing\n        File outFile = new File(absPath.toString().replace(\"/\", File.separator));\n        outStream = new FileOutputStream(outFile, false);\n        inStream = jarFile.getInputStream(entry);\n        OpenmrsUtil.copyFile(inStream, outStream);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Why the check fails:** For an entry named `web/module/foo/../../../../evil.jsp`, `Paths.get(name)` starts with `web`, not `..`, so the check passes. After `name.substring(11)`, the filepath `foo/../../../../evil.jsp` is concatenated directly into the output path without normalization, resulting in a write outside the intended directory.\n\n### Correctly protected code in the same codebase:\n\n**`ModuleUtil.expandJar()`:**\n\n```java\n// ✅ Correct — uses normalize().startsWith()\nif (!parent.toPath().normalize().startsWith(docBase)) {\n    throw new UnsupportedOperationException(\"...\");\n}\n```\n\n**`TestInstallUtil.addZippedTestModules()`:**\n\n```java\n// ✅ Correct — uses normalize().startsWith()\nif (!zipEntryFile.toPath().normalize().startsWith(moduleRepository.toPath().normalize())) {\n    throw new IOException(\"Bad zip entry\");\n}\n```\n\nThe fix pattern is already known and applied elsewhere in the codebase. `WebModuleUtil.startModule()` is an oversight.\n\n### Bypass of `module.allow_web_admin`\n\nThe `module.allow_web_admin` property only restricts module operations at the Legacy UI layer (`ModuleListController`). The REST API endpoint does not consult this property:\n\n```\nLegacy UI:  POST /admin/modules/moduleList.form → allowAdmin() check → [BLOCKED]\nREST API:   POST /ws/rest/v1/module             → No allowAdmin() check → [ALLOWED]\n                ↓\n        ModuleFactory.loadModule()\n                ↓\n        WebModuleUtil.startModule()   ← Zip Slip here, no allowAdmin check\n                ↓\n        FileOutputStream.write()      ← Arbitrary file write\n```\n\n## Remediation\n\nAdd `normalize().startsWith()` boundary validation before writing, consistent with the existing pattern in `ModuleUtil.expandJar()`:\n\n```java\nFile outFile = new File(absPath.toString().replace(\"/\", File.separator));\n\n// ✅ Add this check\nif (!outFile.toPath().normalize().startsWith(\n        Paths.get(realPath, \"WEB-INF\").normalize())) {\n    throw new UnsupportedOperationException(\n        \"Zip entry '\" + name + \"' would be written outside the allowed directory.\");\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, enforce the `module.allow_web_admin` restriction consistently across all module upload entry points, including the REST API.",
   "severity": [
-    {
-      "type": "CVSS_V3",
-      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N"
-    },
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V4",
-      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/"
+      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"
     }
   ],
   "affected": [