Fix shell injection vulnerability in console-check workflow#1690
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Move GitHub context interpolations into environment variables to prevent potential shell injection attacks. All untrusted GitHub context data is now passed through environment variables and properly quoted in shell commands. Fixes: - Line 60: Determine mode step now uses ENV vars for event_name and ref - Line 75: Trigger console build step now uses ENV vars for all GitHub context data References: - Parent ticket: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/VULN-1605 - Child ticket: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/ENG-7570 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
JoshuaMoelans
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May 11, 2026
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JoshuaMoelans
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LGTM, I thought matrix. and github. weren't vulnerable like inputs.X which we moved to env in the consoles side of this workflow, but doesn't hurt to move these into env too.
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Summary
This PR fixes a high-severity shell injection vulnerability in the GitHub Actions workflow
.github/workflows/console-check.yml.Changes
Moved all GitHub context interpolations from direct shell substitution to environment variables to prevent potential code injection attacks:
REPOSITORY,SHA, andCONTEXTenvironment variablesEVENT_NAMEandREFenvironment variablesMATRIX_REPO,NATIVE_REF,CALLBACK_REPO,CALLBACK_SHA,CALLBACK_CONTEXT,MODE, andPR_NUMBERenvironment variablesAll environment variables are properly quoted in the shell commands to prevent injection.
Security Impact
The previous implementation used direct GitHub context interpolation in shell commands (e.g.,
${{ github.repository }}), which could allow attackers to inject malicious code through PR titles, branch names, or other user-controlled GitHub context data.By moving these values to environment variables and properly quoting them, we eliminate the injection vector while maintaining the same functionality.
References
🤖 Generated with fix-it-felix-sentry[bot]
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