Military-grade cryptography with zero external dependencies. NSA Suite B / CNSA 2.0 compliant algorithms implemented entirely in Python stdlib.
- AES-256-GCM (NIST SP 800-38D), ChaCha20-Poly1305 (RFC 8439), AES-256-CBC/CTR
- SHA-256/384/512 (FIPS 180-4), SHA-3/SHAKE (FIPS 202), HMAC, tagged hashing
- HKDF (RFC 5869), PBKDF2 (RFC 2898, 600k+ iterations)
- RSA (OAEP, PSS, Baillie-PSW primality), Ed25519 (RFC 8032), X25519 (RFC 7748), P-256/P-384 (ECDSA + ECDH)
- HMAC_DRBG_SHA256 (NIST SP 800-90A), DigitalURandom (pure-Python entropy: TPM 2.0, /dev/hwrng, jitter, proc/sysfs)
- AWS SigV4 request signing
- Secure memory, constant-time comparison
pip install -e .Or just copy the src/crypto_standalone directory.
from crypto_standalone import ChaCha20Poly1305, AESGCM
cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305(key=b"\x00" * 32)
blob = cipher.encrypt_blob(b"secret message", aad=b"metadata")
plaintext = cipher.decrypt_blob(blob, aad=b"metadata")from crypto_standalone import ed25519_keygen, ed25519_sign, ed25519_verify
from crypto_standalone import x25519_keygen, x25519
sk, pk = ed25519_keygen()
sig = ed25519_sign(b"message", sk)
assert ed25519_verify(b"message", sig, pk)
alice_sk, alice_pk = x25519_keygen()
bob_sk, bob_pk = x25519_keygen()
shared = x25519(alice_sk, bob_pk) # == x25519(bob_sk, alice_pk)from crypto_standalone import hkdf_sha256, pbkdf2_sha256, sha256, hmac_sha256
key = hkdf_sha256(b"salt", b"ikm", b"info", 32)
derived = pbkdf2_sha256(b"password", b"salt", 600_000, 32)
digest = sha256(b"data")
mac = hmac_sha256(key=b"secret", message=b"data")from crypto_standalone import generate_rsa_keypair
kp = generate_rsa_keypair(2048)
ct = kp.public.encrypt_oaep(b"hello")
pt = kp.private.decrypt_oaep(ct)
sig = kp.private.sign_pss(b"message")
assert kp.public.verify_pss(b"message", sig)from crypto_standalone import random_bytes, DigitalURandom
key = random_bytes(32) # uses DigitalURandom internally
rng = DigitalURandom() # direct access
token = rng.urandom(32)# Import only one implementation/module when needed
from crypto_standalone.symmetric.tea import TEA
from crypto_standalone.symmetric.redpike import RedPike
from crypto_standalone.symmetric.avemaria import AveMariaCipher
# Backward-compatible aggregate import still works
from crypto_standalone.symmetric.legacy_ciphers import TEA, RedPike, AveMariaCipherThese legacy ciphers are for compatibility/migration workflows and are not recommended for new system designs.
| Purpose | Recommended | Avoid |
|---|---|---|
| Encryption | ChaCha20-Poly1305 or AES-GCM | AES-CBC without HMAC |
| Hashing | SHA-256 or SHA-384 | SHA-1 |
| Signatures | Ed25519 or P-384 ECDSA | RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 |
| Key agreement | X25519 or P-384 ECDH | — |
| Key derivation | HKDF-SHA256 | — |
| Passwords | PBKDF2-SHA256 (600k+ iter) | — |
| RNG | HMAC_DRBG + DigitalURandom | random module |
- Testing & Caveats — running tests, test categories, CI, security caveats
- Implementation Notes & Threat Model — per-algorithm notes, threat model, dependencies
- Random Number Generation — DigitalURandom, HMAC_DRBG_SHA256, CSPRNG architecture
This project is licensed under the SWORD Restricted Source Licence v1.1 (SRSL-1.1). Non-commercial use is permitted under its terms; commercial exploitation requires a separate written agreement. See LICENSE and migration and historical MIT notes. Rights previously validly granted under earlier licences remain effective for those copies.