C1-A02 — Clarify operator merge authority guarantees - #17
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C1-A02 (P2): `OperatorMergeAuthorization` / `operatorMergeAuthorizes` comments and the C1 architecture document claimed stronger guarantees than the implementation proved. The predicate proves structural binding only: readable required fields, a literal `singleUse === true` marker, and exact repository, pull-request, and current-HEAD SHA equality. It does not prove operator origin, human identity, authentication, trusted minting, signature or possession, uniqueness, one-time consumption, or replay prevention. A plain caller-written object literal passes, and the same record passes repeatedly because C1 has no consumed-capability store. Correct the claims without changing executable authorization semantics. A `true` result is now documented as a necessary binding check, not sufficient proof that a merge is operator-authorized; the future trusted operator boundary / merge broker remains responsible for authenticated operator origin, trusted minting provenance, and one-time consumption. Two focused tests pin the limitation so the documentation cannot drift from the implementation. Ordinary repair-job merge authority is unchanged: still OPERATOR_REQUIRED, mayExecuteOnce=false, permit=null. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Included review availability: Your plan includes up to 1 review per rolling hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change narrows ChangesMerge authorization contract
Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to This PR clarifies operator merge-authority guarantees without changing executable authorization behavior, and the supplied checks pass. A bounded documentation risk remains because exact SHA comparison could still be mistaken for verification of the repository’s live HEAD, so merge is appropriate with explicit owner follow-up. Poem
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| * There is no path that widens, refreshes, or re-binds a record to a newer SHA: | ||
| * a new HEAD requires a new operator decision. |
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When HEAD advances, an untrusted caller can assemble another object literal whose headSha matches the new HEAD, and the newly added test at tests/domain/job-authorization-invariants.test.ts:282-300 confirms that no operator origin or decision is required for such a literal to pass. Therefore the statement that a new HEAD requires a new operator decision preserves the security overclaim this change is intended to remove; C1 only requires a new candidate record, while the future trusted broker must enforce that it represents a new operator decision.
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Inline comments:
In `@src/domain/execution-permit.ts`:
- Around line 325-332: The documentation overstates that operatorMergeAuthorizes
verifies the live repository HEAD. In src/domain/execution-permit.ts lines
325-332, describe the comparison as binding to the supplied
MergeTarget.currentHeadSha; in docs/architecture/C1-repair-job-authority.md
lines 269-275, state that the guarantee depends on a trusted, current
MergeTarget and that the future merge broker must obtain and enforce the
authoritative repository HEAD at merge time.
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docs/architecture/C1-repair-job-authority.mdsrc/domain/execution-permit.tstests/domain/job-authorization-invariants.test.ts
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External review of PR #17 (Codex and CodeRabbit, one root cause) found that the repaired C1-A02 text still described `MergeTarget.currentHeadSha` as if C1 observed an authoritative live repository HEAD. It does not. `operatorMergeAuthorizes` performs no repository read, no GitHub API call, no adapter call, and no network access. It compares `authorization.headSha` against the caller-supplied `target.currentHeadSha` and nothing else, so the binding is only ever as fresh and as authoritative as the target handed to it. Correct the claims without changing executable authorization semantics: - `MergeTarget` fields are documented as caller-supplied input; the "repository's HEAD now, supplied by a trusted adapter" wording is gone. - The predicate's guarantee is stated against the supplied target, with target authoritativeness and freshness listed as not proved. - "a new HEAD requires a new operator decision" is removed. C1 requires only a newly matching candidate record; it cannot tell a fresh human decision from the same untrusted caller assembling another literal. - The architecture document gains an explicit list of what the future trusted Merge Broker must do, including obtaining the authoritative pull-request HEAD immediately before merge and consuming the capability atomically. One test title repeated the same false repository-observation claim and is corrected; assertions are unchanged. Ordinary repair-job merge authority remains OPERATOR_REQUIRED, mayExecuteOnce=false, permit=null. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Finding
C1-A02 — P2 CURRENT at parent HEAD:
a3576f0a181806cc405f0300720dd3c13201a608Protected parent:
PR #14 — Cockpit C1
This is an isolated stacked validation PR targeting:
cockpit/c1-job-authorityIt does NOT target
main.Original defect
OperatorMergeAuthorization/operatorMergeAuthorizescomments and the C1 architecture document claimed stronger guarantees than the implementation proved.The implementation proved structural binding only.
It did NOT prove:
A plain caller-written object literal with matching repo / PR / SHA and
singleUse: truepasses the predicate.The same record can pass repeatedly because C1 has no consumed-capability store.
Repair
Correct the security claims without changing executable authorization semantics.
The repaired source comments and architecture document now distinguish:
What C1 proves
singleUse === trueis present as a structural intent marker;What C1 does not prove
A
trueresult fromoperatorMergeAuthorizesis explicitly documented as a necessary binding check, not sufficient proof that a merge is operator-authorized.The future trusted operator boundary / Merge Broker remains responsible for authenticated operator origin, trusted minting provenance, and one-time consumption.
Scope
Changed files only:
src/domain/execution-permit.tsdocs/architecture/C1-repair-job-authority.mdtests/domain/job-authorization-invariants.test.tsC1-A01 remains FIXED and unchanged.
C1-A03 is NOT repaired here.
No authentication infrastructure.
No merge execution.
No GitHub API.
No replay store.
No unrelated change.
Every changed line in
src/domain/execution-permit.tsis a comment line; the executable text is unchanged.Independent validation
A separate validator that did not implement the repair:
singleUsestill fail;execution-permit.tsis byte-identical after comment stripping;OPERATOR_REQUIRED,mayExecuteOnce=false,permit=null;Independent validation result:
PASS
Validation
Actual results at commit
96f2f0ff07954ea5579437d954b05180e2d14f0a:tests/domain/job-authorization-invariants.test.ts)npm run typechecknpm run lintnpm testnpm run buildnpm auditgit diff --checkQuarantine
This PR must pass external review and CI before it can be considered for integration into protected parent PR #14.
MERGE IS OPERATOR-ONLY.
No AI agent is authorized to merge this repair PR.
No auto-merge.
Summary by CodeRabbit
Documentation
Tests