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Require certifi >= 2026.10.19 for the emSign/eMudhra CA compromise - #1227
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certifi releases before 2026.10.19 trust the compromised emSign/eMudhra roots (GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2), so a MITM could forge a kaggle.com cert and steal API tokens. #1223 pinned certifi only in requirements.lock and tools/releases/requirements.txt, which pip ignores for `pip install kaggle`. kaggle pulled certifi only via requests, which sets no floor, so existing installs could keep a vulnerable bundle. This adds the floor to the published dependencies, and refreshes the OS ca-certificates and pip in the CI image, mirroring Kaggle/kagglehub#318 and Kaggle/kaggle-sdk-python#75. Co-authored-by: kaggle-agent <kaggle-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
stevemessick
approved these changes
Oct 21, 2026
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certifi releases before 2026.10.19 trust the compromised emSign/eMudhra
roots (GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2), so a MITM could forge a kaggle.com cert and
steal API tokens. #1223 pinned certifi only in requirements.lock and
tools/releases/requirements.txt, which pip ignores for
pip install kaggle. kaggle pulled certifi only via requests, whichsets no floor, so existing installs could keep a vulnerable bundle.
This adds the floor to the published dependencies, and refreshes the OS
ca-certificates and pip in the CI image, mirroring Kaggle/kagglehub#318
and Kaggle/kaggle-sdk-python#75.
Co-authored-by: kaggle-agent kaggle-agent@users.noreply.github.com
Task: limagoog-20261021171115-e67bc133
Trajectory: view agent transcript
Context: https://chat.kaggle.net/kaggle/pl/mr3z3gn3b7dipfx66ai5kmpqkh