security: fix SSRF redirect bypass, timing-safe OAuth, atomic credentials#200
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eesb99 wants to merge 5 commits intoCraftOS-dev:V1.2.3from
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security: fix SSRF redirect bypass, timing-safe OAuth, atomic credentials#200eesb99 wants to merge 5 commits intoCraftOS-dev:V1.2.3from
eesb99 wants to merge 5 commits intoCraftOS-dev:V1.2.3from
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…ial perms - Fix socket.gaierror -> _socket.gaierror reference bug that silently disabled SSRF protection when DNS resolution failed - Use hmac.compare_digest() for OAuth state comparison to prevent timing side-channel attacks - Use os.open() with 0o600 mode for atomic credential file permissions instead of write-then-chmod race Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…rcement SSRF (http_request.py): - Extract _is_url_ssrf_safe() helper for reuse across redirect hops - Disable allow_redirects in requests lib, manually follow redirects with SSRF validation on each hop (closes redirect bypass) - Remove fail-open except Exception: pass -- DNS failures now block the request instead of silently allowing it - Unresolvable hostnames return an error (fail closed) OAuth CSRF (oauth_server.py): - Explicit 3-way state handling: no state expected (warn + allow), state expected but missing from callback (reject), mismatch (reject) - Previously silently skipped validation when state was absent Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
4 tasks
…l perms Review-driven fixes: - SSRF: add scheme whitelist (http/https only), strip auth headers on cross-origin redirects, strip body on GET downgrade, preserve method for 307/308 per RFC 7231 - OAuth: use `is None` checks to prevent empty-string state bypass, move `import hmac` to module top-level - Credentials: add os.fchmod() to enforce 0o600 on pre-existing files - Python compat: quote `str | None` annotation for 3.9 support, promote _BLOCKED_HOSTS to frozenset Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Replace 6 repeated error-response dicts with _error() helper - Move urljoin import out of redirect loop, combine with urlparse Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
File was tracked despite .gitignore rule. Removed from index so credentials are no longer committed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Incremental security hardening on top of PR #195 (already merged to V1.2.3). These fixes address 3 remaining vulnerabilities:
http_request.py): Disable automatic redirects and manually follow each hop with SSRF validation, preventing attackers from redirecting to internal IPs. Also fix_socket.gaierrorreference bug and switch to fail-closed on DNS errors.oauth_server.py): Usehmac.compare_digest()for constant-time state comparison. Add explicit 3-way state handling: no state expected (warn + allow), state expected but missing from callback (reject), mismatch (reject).credentials.py): Replace write-then-chmod with atomicos.open()using0o600mode to eliminate the TOCTOU race window.Files changed (3)
app/data/action/http_request.py_is_url_ssrf_safe()helperagent_core/core/credentials/oauth_server.pyapp/external_comms/credentials.pyos.open()Test plan
http://attacker.com->http://169.254.169.254)🤖 Generated with Claude Code