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Update dependency vite to v8.1.6 [SECURITY] - #53893

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Oct 21, 2026
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anomiex merged 3 commits into
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@matticbot matticbot commented Oct 20, 2026 •

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Closes MONOREP-1421

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
vite (source) 8.0.16 → 8.1.6 age confidence

launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows

CVE-2026-112943 / GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor did not escape % on Windows when passing an argument to cmd. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.

Impact

Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:

  • The user uses Windows
  • An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing & or %
  • Either of
    • An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value
    • An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed
Details

Unlike .sh files, .bat / .cmd files on Windows cannot be called directly using child_process.spawn and requires passing them as an argument of cmd.exe. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to cmd.exe. But launch-editor did not escape % which is used for environment variables.

Because launch-editor checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.

  • If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcommand in the env variable (e.g. set &calc.exe to %ENV%) and call launchEditor with something%ENV%.
  • If the attacker can place a NTFS alternate data stream to the file (e.g. a NTFS alternate data stream named ~-38%calc.exe), they can call launchEditor with something %CMDCMDLINE:~-38%calc.exe.
  • If the attacker can create a filename containing the %CD% and the subcommand (e.g. &calc.exe ), they can call launchEditor with ./%CD%

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


launch-editor: fs.existsSync() existence check can be bypassed on Windows

CVE-2026-112942 / GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor checked fs.existsSync(fileName) before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in \\..:line:column. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.

Combined with the % escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.

Impact

Only apps that runs on Windows is affected.

Details

The earlier advisory assumed that fs.existsSync() required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.

A crafted value ending in \\..:1:1 is interpreted differently by launch-editor-middleware, launch-editor, and Windows:

  1. launch-editor-middleware calls path.resolve() while the final path component is ..:1:1, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.
  2. launch-editor treats :1:1 as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in \\...
  3. On Windows, fs.existsSync() accepts the resulting path as the existing parent directory even though the attacker-controlled preceding component does not exist.
  4. Because the existence check passes, the crafted filename reaches the Windows shell command.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors

CVE-2026-112944 / GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor forwarded file paths directly to editors without sanitization. If a path resembles a CLI flag, editors like Vim may interpret it as a command, potentially causing unintended file overwrites or command execution.

Impact
Direct launch-editor users

Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:

  • The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
  • The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
    • Vim (including gVim)
    • MacVim
    • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
    • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
  • The first argument of launchEditor can start with + or - or the user is using WSL
launch-editor-middleware users

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

  • The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
  • The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
    • Vim (including gVim)
    • MacVim
    • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
    • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
  • launch-editor older than v2.2.0 is used, or the user is using WSL
Vite users

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

  • The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
  • The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
    • Vim (including gVim)
    • MacVim
    • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
    • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
  • The user is using WSL
Details

launchEditor(file) function passes the file name as-is to the editor if the file with that file name exists. If the file name starts with - (also + for Vim), the editor treats them as flags rather than positional arguments. For example, Vim treats arguments starting with + as an Ex command. As a result, an existing relative directory such as:

+call writefile(["SAFE_MARKER"],"LAUNCH_EDITOR_MARKER")|qa!

is not treated as a filename when passed to Vim. Vim executes the embedded Ex command.

The following editor has a potentially destructive operation exposed to the CLI arguments:

  • Vim (including gVim)
  • MacVim
  • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
  • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)

launch-editor-middleware v2.2.0+ converts the passed file path to an absolute path so those are not affected as long as the user is not using WSL. For WSL, launch-editor converts the paths to relative paths internally, so those are still affected.

Vite 2.0.0+ uses launch-editor-middleware v2.2.0+ so the WSL users are only affected.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


launch-editor: fs.existsSync() existence check can be bypassed on Windows

CVE-2026-112942 / GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor checked fs.existsSync(fileName) before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in \\..:line:column. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.

Combined with the % escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.

Impact

Only apps that runs on Windows is affected.

Details

The earlier advisory assumed that fs.existsSync() required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.

A crafted value ending in \\..:1:1 is interpreted differently by launch-editor-middleware, launch-editor, and Windows:

  1. launch-editor-middleware calls path.resolve() while the final path component is ..:1:1, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.
  2. launch-editor treats :1:1 as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in \\...
  3. On Windows, fs.existsSync() accepts the resulting path as the existing parent directory even though the attacker-controlled preceding component does not exist.
  4. Because the existence check passes, the crafted filename reaches the Windows shell command.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows

CVE-2026-112943 / GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor did not escape % on Windows when passing an argument to cmd. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.

Impact

Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:

  • The user uses Windows
  • An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing & or %
  • Either of
    • An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value
    • An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed
Details

Unlike .sh files, .bat / .cmd files on Windows cannot be called directly using child_process.spawn and requires passing them as an argument of cmd.exe. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to cmd.exe. But launch-editor did not escape % which is used for environment variables.

Because launch-editor checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.

  • If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcommand in the env variable (e.g. set &calc.exe to %ENV%) and call launchEditor with something%ENV%.
  • If the attacker can place a NTFS alternate data stream to the file (e.g. a NTFS alternate data stream named ~-38%calc.exe), they can call launchEditor with something %CMDCMDLINE:~-38%calc.exe.
  • If the attacker can create a filename containing the %CD% and the subcommand (e.g. &calc.exe ), they can call launchEditor with ./%CD%

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors

CVE-2026-112944 / GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor forwarded file paths directly to editors without sanitization. If a path resembles a CLI flag, editors like Vim may interpret it as a command, potentially causing unintended file overwrites or command execution.

Impact
Direct launch-editor users

Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:

  • The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
  • The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
    • Vim (including gVim)
    • MacVim
    • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
    • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
  • The first argument of launchEditor can start with + or - or the user is using WSL
launch-editor-middleware users

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

  • The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
  • The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
    • Vim (including gVim)
    • MacVim
    • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
    • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
  • launch-editor older than v2.2.0 is used, or the user is using WSL
Vite users

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

  • The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
  • The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
    • Vim (including gVim)
    • MacVim
    • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
    • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
  • The user is using WSL
Details

launchEditor(file) function passes the file name as-is to the editor if the file with that file name exists. If the file name starts with - (also + for Vim), the editor treats them as flags rather than positional arguments. For example, Vim treats arguments starting with + as an Ex command. As a result, an existing relative directory such as:

+call writefile(["SAFE_MARKER"],"LAUNCH_EDITOR_MARKER")|qa!

is not treated as a filename when passed to Vim. Vim executes the embedded Ex command.

The following editor has a potentially destructive operation exposed to the CLI arguments:

  • Vim (including gVim)
  • MacVim
  • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
  • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)

launch-editor-middleware v2.2.0+ converts the passed file path to an absolute path so those are not affected as long as the user is not using WSL. For WSL, launch-editor converts the paths to relative paths internally, so those are still affected.

Vite 2.0.0+ uses launch-editor-middleware v2.2.0+ so the WSL users are only affected.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

v8.1.6

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v8.1.5

Compare Source

Features
Bug Fixes
Performance Improvements
  • config: skip native config compat check when warning is ignored (#​23000) (18535d1)
  • optimizer: check popular package manager lockfiles first (#​22909) (14fcb66)
Documentation
Miscellaneous Chores
Tests
Beta Changelogs
8.2.0-beta.0 (2026-07-22)

See 8.2.0-beta.0 changelog

v8.1.4

Compare Source

Features
Bug Fixes
Documentation
Miscellaneous Chores
Code Refactoring
Tests
Build System

v8.1.3

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

v8.1.2

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

v8.1.1

Compare Source

Features
Bug Fixes
Miscellaneous Chores
Code Refactoring
  • css: remove lightningcss null byte bug workaround (#​22822) (2dafd3b)
  • use pre-defined environments variable to avoid duplicate Object.values calls (#​22790) (1113acf)
Tests
  • enable "manual chunk path" test and remove "worker.format error" test (#​22824) (c088511)

v8.1.0

Compare Source

Features
Bug Fixes
Documentation
Miscellaneous Chores
Code Refactoring
Beta Changelogs
8.1.0-beta.0 (2026-06-15)

See 8.1.0-beta.0 changelog


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@matticbot
matticbot requested a review from a team as a code owner October 20, 2026 20:38
@matticbot matticbot added [Status] Needs Review This PR is ready for review. Task labels Oct 20, 2026
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github-actions Bot commented Oct 20, 2026 •

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Are you an Automattician? Please test your changes on all WordPress.com environments to help mitigate accidental explosions.

  • To test on WoA, go to the Plugins menu on a WoA dev site. Click on the "Upload" button and follow the upgrade flow to be able to upload, install, and activate the Jetpack Beta plugin. Once the plugin is active, go to Jetpack > Jetpack Beta, select your plugin (Jetpack or WordPress.com Site Helper), and enable the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch.
  • To test on Simple, run the following command on your sandbox:
bin/jetpack-downloader test jetpack renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability
bin/jetpack-downloader test jetpack-mu-wpcom-plugin renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability

Interested in more tips and information?

  • In your local development environment, use the jetpack rsync command to sync your changes to a WoA dev blog.
  • Read more about our development workflow here: PCYsg-eg0-p2
  • Figure out when your changes will be shipped to customers here: PCYsg-eg5-p2

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Code Coverage Summary

This PR did not change code coverage!

That could be good or bad, depending on the situation. Everything covered before, and still is? Great! Nothing was covered before? Not so great. 🤷

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Edited/Blocked Notification

Renovate will not automatically rebase this PR, because it does not recognize the last commit author and assumes somebody else may have edited the PR.

You can manually request rebase by checking the rebase/retry box above.

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@anomiex
anomiex merged commit 167e639 into trunk Oct 21, 2026
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@anomiex
anomiex deleted the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch October 21, 2026 17:04
@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the [Status] Needs Review This PR is ready for review. label Oct 21, 2026
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3 participants