SyncUp on Android exposes a small broadcast-intent surface so automation tools (Tasker, MacroDroid, Llama, etc.) can start the daemon, stop it, or force a folder rescan. This is Android-only.
The broadcast surface is off by default. Open SyncUp → Settings → Automation → Allow external control. Read the dialog, confirm. Until that toggle is on, every broadcast is logged and dropped:
W AppConfigReceiver: rejected com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.START: external control disabled in settings
Flip the toggle off again at any time to revoke the surface.
am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver \
-a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.START
Equivalent of opening the app, the foreground service starts and the daemon comes up. No-op if already running.
am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver \
-a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.STOP
Stops the foreground service. The persistent notification disappears and sync halts until the next start.
am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver \
-a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.RESCAN
POSTs /rest/db/scan to the local daemon. Daemon must be running.
am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver \
-a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.RESCAN \
--es folder "<folder-id>"
Same as above but limited to one folder. The folder extra is the folder
ID (not the label), get it from the folder detail screen. An unknown
folder ID returns HTTP 500 from the daemon and is logged as
rescan returned 500 in AppConfigReceiver logcat.
In Tasker, Send Intent action:
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Action | com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.START |
| Cat | None |
| Target | Broadcast Receiver |
Sample triggers:
- Start when on home WiFi: WiFi Connected (SSID = home) → Send Intent START.
- Stop when battery < 20%: Battery Level < 20 → Send Intent STOP.
- Force rescan when entering office: Enter Geofence → Send Intent
RESCAN with
folderextra set to your work-vault folder ID.
For the RESCAN action with a folder extra in Tasker, set:
- Extra:
folder:work-vault
(Replace work-vault with the actual folder ID, visible in the SyncUp
folder detail screen.)
Useful for verifying the surface works without installing Tasker:
adb shell am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver -a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.START
adb shell am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver -a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.RESCAN
adb shell am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver -a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.RESCAN --es folder "<folder-id>"
adb shell am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver -a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.STOP
The receiver logs to logcat under tag AppConfigReceiver. Tail with:
adb logcat -s AppConfigReceiver
The threat model: this surface lets any other app on the device drive SyncUp's daemon lifecycle. Without thinking about it, that's an unwarranted ambient-authority grant.
The mitigations layered on:
- Default-OFF opt-in. Settings → Automation → Allow external control
has to be flipped on by the user. Until it is, every broadcast is
dropped with a
rejectedwarning in logcat. - Caller logging. When a broadcast is accepted, the receiver logs
the action and the calling package (or
unknownif Android does not surface it) at INFO level.adb logcat -s AppConfigReceiveraudits the trail. - Action surface is intentionally narrow. The receiver only handles start, stop, and rescan. There is no broadcast surface for adding folders, accepting devices, changing config, or anything that modifies cluster state. Anything destructive still requires the UI.
- Foreground-service-only side effects. START/STOP route through
SyncthingServicewhich runs as adataSyncforeground service — the system surfaces the persistent notification while the daemon is alive, so a misbehaving automation that flaps the daemon is visible.
What this is not:
- A per-caller authorization model. Once the toggle is on, every app on
the device can fire the intents. Users who need finer control can fork
the receiver and add an
android:permissionattribute that gates by a customsignature-protected permission their automation app holds. That's intentionally not the default — it would break Tasker for the median user. - Encrypted-in-transit. Broadcasts are local IPC; there is no transport to attack. The threat is a malicious app on the same device, which the opt-in toggle is the answer to.