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AUTOMATION.md

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Automating SyncUp on Android

SyncUp on Android exposes a small broadcast-intent surface so automation tools (Tasker, MacroDroid, Llama, etc.) can start the daemon, stop it, or force a folder rescan. This is Android-only.


Enable external control first

The broadcast surface is off by default. Open SyncUp → Settings → Automation → Allow external control. Read the dialog, confirm. Until that toggle is on, every broadcast is logged and dropped:

W AppConfigReceiver: rejected com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.START: external control disabled in settings

Flip the toggle off again at any time to revoke the surface.


Actions

Start the daemon

am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver \
  -a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.START

Equivalent of opening the app, the foreground service starts and the daemon comes up. No-op if already running.

Stop the daemon

am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver \
  -a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.STOP

Stops the foreground service. The persistent notification disappears and sync halts until the next start.

Rescan all folders

am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver \
  -a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.RESCAN

POSTs /rest/db/scan to the local daemon. Daemon must be running.

Rescan a specific folder

am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver \
  -a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.RESCAN \
  --es folder "<folder-id>"

Same as above but limited to one folder. The folder extra is the folder ID (not the label), get it from the folder detail screen. An unknown folder ID returns HTTP 500 from the daemon and is logged as rescan returned 500 in AppConfigReceiver logcat.


Tasker recipes

In Tasker, Send Intent action:

Field Value
Action com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.START
Cat None
Target Broadcast Receiver

Sample triggers:

  • Start when on home WiFi: WiFi Connected (SSID = home) → Send Intent START.
  • Stop when battery < 20%: Battery Level < 20 → Send Intent STOP.
  • Force rescan when entering office: Enter Geofence → Send Intent RESCAN with folder extra set to your work-vault folder ID.

For the RESCAN action with a folder extra in Tasker, set:

  • Extra: folder:work-vault

(Replace work-vault with the actual folder ID, visible in the SyncUp folder detail screen.)


ADB testing

Useful for verifying the surface works without installing Tasker:

adb shell am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver -a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.START
adb shell am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver -a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.RESCAN
adb shell am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver -a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.RESCAN --es folder "<folder-id>"
adb shell am broadcast -n com.siddarthkay.syncup/.AppConfigReceiver -a com.siddarthkay.syncup.action.STOP

The receiver logs to logcat under tag AppConfigReceiver. Tail with:

adb logcat -s AppConfigReceiver

Security considerations

The threat model: this surface lets any other app on the device drive SyncUp's daemon lifecycle. Without thinking about it, that's an unwarranted ambient-authority grant.

The mitigations layered on:

  1. Default-OFF opt-in. Settings → Automation → Allow external control has to be flipped on by the user. Until it is, every broadcast is dropped with a rejected warning in logcat.
  2. Caller logging. When a broadcast is accepted, the receiver logs the action and the calling package (or unknown if Android does not surface it) at INFO level. adb logcat -s AppConfigReceiver audits the trail.
  3. Action surface is intentionally narrow. The receiver only handles start, stop, and rescan. There is no broadcast surface for adding folders, accepting devices, changing config, or anything that modifies cluster state. Anything destructive still requires the UI.
  4. Foreground-service-only side effects. START/STOP route through SyncthingService which runs as a dataSync foreground service — the system surfaces the persistent notification while the daemon is alive, so a misbehaving automation that flaps the daemon is visible.

What this is not:

  • A per-caller authorization model. Once the toggle is on, every app on the device can fire the intents. Users who need finer control can fork the receiver and add an android:permission attribute that gates by a custom signature-protected permission their automation app holds. That's intentionally not the default — it would break Tasker for the median user.
  • Encrypted-in-transit. Broadcasts are local IPC; there is no transport to attack. The threat is a malicious app on the same device, which the opt-in toggle is the answer to.